How Far Can the BN-PN Pact Go?

 

Let's put our thinking caps on and ask: How far can UMNO-PN political cooperation really go? Will it survive beyond the 16th General Election (GE16)?

Both UMNO and PAS are ultimately competing for largely the same Malay-Muslim voter base. Neither party has traditionally enjoyed significant support among non-Muslim voters, making any long-term partnership a delicate balancing act rather than a natural political marriage. Historically, the relationship between the two parties has been characterised by cycles of cooperation, competition, and eventual fallout.

At best, what we see in cooperation by both parties is likely to remain transactional whenever electoral mathematics make it advantageous. Both have very differing ideologies, leadership ambitions, and competition for the same constituency. Periodic clashes will be almost inevitable, especially when power is in their hands. 

The only reason it seems to work in Johor and Negeri Sembilan is that PAS knows that in these two states they can only play second fiddle. Even if the main leaders in both parties want the cooperation to go on, the grassroots in PAS-controlled states, which were once under Barisan Nasional may not necessarily want the hegemony under PAS. 

In fact, most Malays especially the educated ones would rather leave PAS out of the equation, which is the reason why the pact between PAS and Bersatu did not last very long. In the end, it is Bersatu that was being played out after a split happened between its founding president, Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Muhyiddin Yasin. Mahathir had to bow out.

When UMNO and PAS work together, UMNO leaders would have to watch their backs, because they would not know how PAS would again strike to cause the party to split. Understandably, it has happened before that when PAS was with Pakatan Harapan, it always played the devil's advocate to cause a split within PKR, which was supposed to be main political party. When PKR chose its President Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail to be the Selangor Mentri Besar, PAS chose the rival, Azmin Ali. 

Although MCA president Wee Ka Siong is quick to point out that the pact between UMNO and PAS would not affect MCA, the fact is it will make it almost impossible for MCA and MIC to win back the non-Muslim votes. In fact, the stronger the Malay-Muslim focus of any alliance, the more challenging it becomes for the other two race-based parties to justify their place within the coalition, as most Chinese and Indian voters, as well as urban Malay voters are always skeptical about politics mired with religion. This has been one of the longstanding contradictions facing any attempt to formalise UMNO-PAS cooperation. 

The East Malaysian factor presents an even greater obstacle. Sarawak, in particular, has always been protective of its political autonomy and demographic composition. PAS' Islamist platform is unlikely to gain broad acceptance in a state where Christians form a substantial portion of the population. For the sake of their political hold of the state, Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) is unlikely to risk losing its support by collaborating with a BN-PN pact, where PAS plays a dominant role. 

Likewise, Sabah's political landscape is highly localised, with regional parties and local interests often taking precedence over Peninsular political narratives. PAS has struggled to establish a meaningful foothold in either state, while West Malaysian political parties generally face resistance when perceived as attempting to dominate East Malaysian affairs.

This reality matters because federal power cannot be won through Peninsular Malaysia alone. In fact, GPS has already sounded out A Sarawak leader has disputed a claim that East Malaysian parties stand to lose their kingmaker role at the next parliamentary general election because the informal alliance of Barisan Nasional and Perikatan Nasional appeared likely to win a simple majority and form a federal government on their own.

Pay attention to Abdul Karim's claim 

Abdul Karim Rahman Hamzah has rightly pointed out that political dynamics may shift over time, but Sabah and Sarawak will remain central to the formation of any federal government. Indeed, he has stressed that no serious analysis of Malaysian politics can ignore the fact that the political pendulum increasingly rests in East Malaysia. Any coalition aspiring to govern Putrajaya must therefore take into account the interests, aspirations, and electoral weight of both Sabah and Sarawak.

For the moment, UMNO may be operating on the assumption that Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) could eventually play a supporting role similar to the one it played during the Barisan Nasional era. As an incentive, UMNO could even offer the position of Deputy Prime Minister to a GPS leader, as has been done in recent federal arrangements. However, the political landscape has changed significantly since the days when Sarawak parties were firmly anchored within the BN framework.

One should also recognise that the Pakatan Harapan administration was the first federal government to formally elevate the significance of Hari Malaysia, giving greater prominence to the historical role of Sabah and Sarawak within the federation. This move was widely viewed as an acknowledgment that East Malaysia is more than merely a fixed deposit for federal coalitions, but rather a critical partner in the nation's political and constitutional development.

Equally important is Sarawak's long-standing resistance to political domination from Peninsular Malaysia. While PKR was eventually permitted to establish a presence and operate within the state, UMNO was consistently kept at arm's length. During the tenure of the late Tun Pehin Sri Abdul Taib Mahmud, Sarawak maintained a firm position against UMNO's direct expansion into the state, preferring instead to safeguard its political autonomy through locally based parties. The state's leadership viewed the preservation of Sarawak's political space as essential to protecting its unique interests within the federation.

East Malaysians are now fully aware that it was UMNO that drafted the Petroleum Act and had it signed when a state of emergency was declared in East Malaysia, to control the petroleum resources in the states. 

This historical context complicates any assumption that GPS would automatically align itself behind a future UMNO-led political project with PAS as a partner. Sarawak's leaders are acutely aware of their bargaining power in a fragmented political environment. Unlike in the past, when East Malaysian parties often followed the lead of their Peninsular counterparts, GPS now occupies a position where it can negotiate from strength and extract meaningful concessions in return for its support. However, its electoral base -- largely Christian -- is unlikely to accept PAS, which has always been seen as an Islamist party since its inception.

Consequently, any UMNO-PAS or broader UMNO-PN arrangement seeking to capture Putrajaya must first answer a more fundamental question: can it secure the confidence of Sabah and Sarawak? Without substantial support from East Malaysia, even the most ambitious Peninsular political pact may find itself falling short of a parliamentary majority. In today's Malaysia, the road to Putrajaya does not pass exclusively through Johor, Selangor, Kedah, or Kelantan. It also runs through Kuching and Kota Kinabalu. 

Politicians may like to believe that everything is negotiable, including political alignments with Sarawak. However, Sarawak's leaders are acutely aware of the limits of political bargaining. They understand that any move perceived as compromising the state's social fabric or political autonomy could provoke a strong backlash from the grassroots.

The reality is that a significant segment of Sarawak's electorate would be reluctant to embrace an Islamist-oriented party, regardless of attempts to project a more moderate image. While PAS may seek to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional base, Sarawak's unique demographic composition, multireligious character, and long-standing preference for locally rooted politics make such overtures particularly challenging. As a result, Sarawak leaders know that there is little room to "rock the boat" on this issue, especially when public sentiment remains firmly attached to the state's distinct political identity and its tradition of religious and cultural moderation.

In that sense, the constraints facing Sarawak's leaders are not merely political but electoral. They may engage with any federal coalition out of pragmatism, but they cannot afford to ignore the reality that their voters are likely to reject any arrangement that appears to give undue influence to an Islamist party, regardless of how moderate that party seeks to portray itself.

The reality is that a significant segment of Sarawak's electorate would be reluctant to embrace an Islamist-oriented party, regardless of attempts to project a more moderate image. While PAS may seek to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional base, Sarawak's unique demographic composition, multireligious character, and long-standing preference for locally rooted politics make such overtures particularly challenging. As a result, Sarawak leaders know that there is little room to "rock the boat" on this issue, especially when public sentiment remains firmly attached to the state's distinct political identity and its tradition of religious and cultural moderation. This is something that even former Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak readily acknowledged as unique for Sarawak, after the case of Rooney was brought to his attention by the late Chief Minister, Adenan Satem, during Sarawak's last state election. 

In that sense, the constraints facing Sarawak's leaders are not merely political but electoral. They may engage with any federal coalition out of pragmatism, but they cannot afford to ignore the reality that their voters are likely to reject any arrangement that appears to give undue influence to an Islamist party, regardless of how moderate that party seeks to rebrand itself.

Since the emergence of East Malaysia as the kingmaker in Malaysian politics, any coalition aspiring to form the federal government must secure substantial support from Sabah and Sarawak. Without meaningful backing from both states, even a strong UMNO-PAS pact would find it difficult to command a parliamentary majority in Putrajaya. In fact, 

The strategic question, therefore, is whether UMNO would be willing to sacrifice its long-term ambition of reclaiming its position as the dominant national party. For decades, UMNO was not merely the largest Malay party; it was the "big brother" of Malaysian politics, capable of attracting support across regions and communities through the Barisan Nasional framework. A closer alignment with PAS may strengthen UMNO's position among Malay voters in the short term, but it could also limit the party's ability to rebuild broader national appeal, especially in the states that were once governed by BN. Its grassroots revolt in these states may force BN leadership to come head on with PAS.

Recent state elections have also demonstrated the unequal nature of any potential partnership. In states such as Johor and Negeri Sembilan, PAS has generally had to accept a secondary role, acknowledging UMNO's stronger grassroots machinery and historical presence. However, PAS would undoubtedly expect reciprocal recognition of its dominance in its traditional strongholds. 

That raises perhaps the most important question of all. Today, PAS enjoys considerable strength in Kedah, Perlis, and Terengganu, which were once Barisan Nasional bastions. PAS was also seeking to capture Pahang in the last general election; however, it failed. The biq question must ask is: If UMNO and PAS were to pursue a durable political arrangement, would UMNO be prepared to effectively concede these territories to PAS in exchange for influence elsewhere? More importantly, would UMNO's grassroots leaders and members accept such an arrangement given the party's long-standing aspiration to regain lost ground?

Ultimately, the biggest obstacle to a lasting UMNO-PAS partnership is not ideology but ambition. Both parties want to lead the Malay-Muslim political space. Cooperation may be possible when circumstances demand it, particularly before an election. But as history has repeatedly shown, temporary electoral convenience is very different from a sustainable political settlement. Once power comes into play, the challenge is not whether UMNO and PAS can work together, but whether either side is willing to permanently play second fiddle to the other. Based on their history, that remains highly unlikely.

As long as Anwar Ibrahim and the Pakatan Harapan coalition, particularly DAP, can realign themselves with the reform agenda that inspired the wave of support seen in 2018, there remains a credible path for Pakatan Harapan to regain lost ground. Sabah, Johor and Negeri Sembilan were just calculated defeats in view of a bigger victory by next General Election. However, Anwar should know how to make full use of the remaining fifth year in power to right the wrong in the past, and what I foresee is that Anwar may ultimately have the last laugh, rather than UMNO or PAS. UMNO would, in fact, be better off if it continues to work with PH, but whether PH will once again consider it as a genuine partner has yet to be seen.

Increasingly, most voters acknowledge that a continued boycott of Pakatan Harapan does not necessarily produce better alternatives, especially if the opposition is unable to offer a more compelling vision of governance, but they still have send a strong message to Anwar and his coalition: "It's not you, but us, who hold the trump cards when an election is on." 

At the same time, DAP must navigate the political landscape with greater wisdom and humility. The party should remain committed to the spirit of reconciliation it sought to demonstrate through its outreach and apology to Sarawakians. If DAP hopes to strengthen its standing beyond its traditional strongholds, it cannot afford to be perceived as dismissive of local sentiments or regional aspirations.

More broadly, Pakatan Harapan's future may depend not only on policy delivery but also on its ability to reconnect with voters who once believed in its reformist promise. It must also take good care of both East Malaysian regions and honouring the Malaysia Agreement. For DAP in particular, that means shedding any lingering perception of arrogance and embracing a more consultative and inclusive approach. If PH can rediscover the reformist energy, discipline, and humility that powered its 2018 victory, it may yet remain the coalition best positioned to retain federal power despite the manoeuvring of UMNO and PAS.

Most people in Negeri Sembilan I spoke to agree that Anwar and PH have done all they could to put Malaysia on the right alignment again; they and I cannot risk the country going to the dogs once again, unless of course, if PH continues to fail us. 

PH leaders must learn that the trophy they’re holding after the Madani government was formed is something they get they deserve. Instead, they should realise that Umno has already started to put emphasis on serving the people instead of remaining as lords over the electorate. Enough is already said; the strong message has been delivered through three state elections: arrogant leaders will face the people’s wrath, no difference even if they are from PH. In a democracy, no politicisn is indispensable.